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Digital information is pervasive in today’s society.
Many potential sources of digital information:
• Desktops; Laptops




“Digital forensics” — the recovery, analysis & use of this information
• Law enforcement — Document a conspiracy (stock fraud; murder-for-hire; Silk Road)
• DOD — Identify members of a terrorist organization.
• Cyber investigations — Find and understand malware
• Ordinary people — Recover deleted files.
3
Typical computer might have:
• Millions of files; dozens of applications
• Data from many different people
• Information in many different formats
Digital forensic tools allow for:
• Viewing hidden information / recovery of deleted files
• Rapidly analyzing large amounts of subject data




• Recover specific information critical to a case:
—Identity information (contacts, etc.) 
—Contraband information (stolen documents, criminal content)
These tools can also be used for:
• Privacy auditing; software testing
We need digital forensics because digital devices are 
exceedingly complex.
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The Real Data Corpus (80TB)
• Data from ≈4000 used hard drives, phones, and other devices purchased abroad.
• Organized by country.
• IRB approval required to use.
“GOVDOCS” (500GB)
• ≈1 million files downloaded from US government web servers.
• No restrictions on use or redistribution.
Scenarios (multiple computers, packet captures, memory, etc.) (2TB)
• Designed to teach digital forensics.
—+50 universities, +1000 students have used in past 3 years.
• No restrictions on use or redistribution.
• Can also be used for original research.
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We have created multiple “corpora” to support digital 
forensics education and research.
Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev and Dinolt, 
Bringing Science to Digital Forensics 
with Standardized Forensic Corpora, 
DFRWS 2009. BEST PAPER AWARD.
http://digitalcorpora.org/ 
The “digital corpora” are part of a broad research effort in 
digital forensics.
Identifying high-value data (Triage)
• What is important?  
—Contacts, calendar, documents?
—Geolocation information?
Making extracted data available for automated analysis
• Data representations (DFXML)
• Programming environments (DFXML Toolkit)
Creating new approaches for correlation (Cross-drive analysis)
• Identify previously unknown organizations or networks
• Identify data that is unusual or emerging
Sector hashing for triage and fragment recovery




Snapchat promised users that expired images could not be 
viewed unless “saved.”
8
Snapchat promised users that expired images could not be 
viewed unless “saved.”
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OMG! — Expired images were not actually deleted.
They were just hidden from view.
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5/10/13 Recover deleted Snapchats? Decipher Forensics finds sexting app's privacy problem.
www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/09/recover_deleted_snapchats_decipher_forensics_finds_sexting_app_s_privacy.html 1/2
By  Will  Oremus  |  Posted  Thursday,  May  9,  2013,  at  3:56  PM
Snapchat's  users  shouldn't  be  shocked  to  find  that
their  images  can  be  recovered  even  after  they  "self-­
destruct"—but  they  will  be  anyway.
Sylvie  Bouchard/Shutterstock.com
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THE  CITIZEN'S  GUIDE  TO  THE  FUTURE
OMG,  "Deleted"  Snapchat  Sexts  Can  Actually  Be
Recovered
The  premise  of  Snapchat  is  simple:  Send  a  photo  or
short  video  to  a  friend,  and  it  will  self-­destruct  after
10  seconds.  That  way,  it  won’t  wind  up  on  the
Internet  and  ruin  anyone’s  reputation,  friendships,
or  career.
Needless  to  say,  that  has  made  it  a  wildly  popular
choice  for  sexting.  But  Snapchat’s  appeal  goes  far
beyond  that.  In  an  age  in  which  “privacy”  and
“technology”  have  become  almost  antonymous,  it
has  been  billed  as  the  anti-­Facebook—a
communications  tool  that  deletes  your  data  rather
than  preserving,  analyzing,  and  trading  on  it.  In
short,  it’s  supposed  to  make  messaging  fun  again.
But  the  app’s  security  has  never  been  ironclad.  As
the  media  have  repeatedly  warned  parents,  and
parents  in  turn  warned  their  kids,  message
recipients  can  still  save  a  compromising  image  by
taking  a  quick  screenshot.  But  Snapchat  tries  to
mitigate  the  risk  somewhat  by  automatically
notifying  the  sender  when  that  happens.  If
someone  screenshots  you,  it’s  a  virtual  slap  in  the
face.  If  they  don’t,  you  can  assume  you’re  in  the
clear.
Except  that  apparently  you  can’t.  KSL-­TV  in  Utah
reports  that  an  Orem-­based  firm  called  Decipher
Forensics  has  figured  out  a  way  to  recover  supposedly  deleted  images  from  the  recipient’s
phone.  The  process  isn’t  simple:  24-­year-­old  Decipher  forensics  examiner  Richard  Hickman  told
the  network  that  it  takes  him  about  six  hours,  on  average,  to  image  the  phone’s  data.  So  far
he  can  only  do  it  with  Android  devices,  though  he’s  working  on  doing  the  same  for  iOS.  But  his
firm  is  now  offering  to  perform  the  recovery  procedure  for  anyone  who  wants  it,  from  parents
to  lawyers  to  the  police,  for  $300  to  $500.
Snapchat  is  trying  to  brush  off  the  finding.  “We’re  not  really  paying  much  attention  to  it,”
spokeswoman  Mary  Ritti  told  U.S.  News  on  Thursday.  “I  mean,  it’s  forensic  software.”
She  has  a  point.  Forensic  software  can  also  recover  lots  of  other  things  you  thought  you  had
deleted  from  your  phone  or  computer,  provided  the  data  hasn’t  yet  been  overwritten  by  other
files.  The  reason  we  don’t  all  live  in  fear  of  this  happening  is  because  it  requires  someone  to
take  possession  of  your  device,  then  spend  a  bunch  of  time  and  money  combing  through  the
hidden  data.  If  they  can  do  that,  odds  are  you  have  other  security  problems  on  your  hands
besides  the  potential  recovery  of  some  embarrassing  snapshots.
And  for  what  it’s  worth,  Snapchat’s  privacy  policy  explicitly  states  that  there’s  no  guarantee
your  data  will  always  be  deleted.  “Messages,  therefore,  are  sent  at  the  risk  of  the  user,”  it  says.
Still,  Snapchat’s  users  are  unlikely  to  be  mollified  if  it  turns  out  their  nude  selfies  have  been
preserved  for  posterity  after  all.
If  Snapchat’s  young  founders  soon  find  themselves  on  the  wrong  end  of  a  successful  lawsuit,
the  lesson  won’t  be  that  they  failed  at  protecting  their  users’  privacy.  It  will  be  that  it’s
dangerous  to  build  a  business  on  the  illusion  of  privacy  in  the  first  place.
Will  Oremus  is  the  lead  blogger  for
Future  Tense,  reporting  on  emerging
technologies,  tech  policy,  and  digital
culture.  Future  Tense  is  a  project  from
Slate,  the  New  America  Foundation,
and  Arizona  State  University.
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FTC charged Snapchat with deceptive practices.
Snapchat settled.
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Like Snapchat, GPS devices also retain private data 
not visible in the user interface.
 Many kinds of data are “encoded.”
 Finding these requires
 “optimistic decoding.”
  Our study of 1400 drives found
  thousands of email addresses
  that were only in compressed data.
   Evaluating impact of simple obfuscation
This talk is about finding privacy-sensitive information in 
stored data.
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It’s so hard that none of the commercial or open source 
digital forensic will show these email addresses.
13
e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......




This may be a serious problem.






























Exploring a consumer GPS 
device for hidden private data.
12
The Garmin Nüvi works with GPS information.
13
The Garmin Nüvi works with GPS information.
13
The Garmin Nüvi shows where you are…
… but it retains much more information.
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The “Trip log” shows where you have been.
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These files are visible when the Garmin GPS is plugged into a computer.
Questions:
• What information is in these files?
• Is there information in these files
not visible from the user interface?
• Is there privacy-sensitive
information elsewhere on the
device?
The trip log data are kept in “.gpx” files.
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The file 24.gpx contains track information in XML format.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?><gpx xmlns="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1" 
xmlns:gpxx="http://www.garmin.com/xmlschemas/GpxExtensions/v3" xmlns:gpxtpx="http://www.garmin.com/xmlschemas/








































The file 24.gpx has 766,553 ÷ 266 ≈ 2,900 tracking points in it.
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(Reformatted for improved readability)
<trkpt lat="38.885058" lon="-77.114068">
       <ele>88.58</ele><time>2013-08-23T14:47:54Z</time>
       <gpxtpx:speed>5.49</gpxtpx:speed>
       <gpxtpx:course>180.71</gpxtpx:course>
</trkpt>
<trkpt lat="38.885008" lon="-77.114062">
       <ele>88.10</ele><time>2013-08-23T14:47:55Z</time>
       <gpxtpx:speed>5.49</gpxtpx:speed>
       <gpxtpx:course>177.88</gpxtpx:course>
</trkpt>




This program extract and tabulates gpxtpx:speed records 
from the GPX files:
import xml.sax, os, glob
class SpeedReader(xml.sax.ContentHandler):
    def __init__(self):
        xml.sax.ContentHandler.__init__(self)
        self.cdata = ""
        self.speeds = []
    def startElement(self,name,attrs):
        self.inElement = name
        self.cdata     = ""
    def characters(self,content):
        self.cdata += content
    def endElement(self,name):
        if name=="gpxtpx:speed":
            self.speeds.append(float(self.cdata))
def get_gpx_speeds(fn):
    sr = SpeedReader()
    try:
        xml.sax.parse(open(fn,"rb"),sr)
    except xml.sax._exceptions.SAXParseException:
        pass
    print(fn,min(sr.speeds),max(sr.speeds),len(sr.speeds))
if __name__=="__main__":
    for fn in glob.glob("*.gpx"):
        get_gpx_speeds(fn)
25
The program documents that the GPS was moving faster 
than 34 m/s (≈75 MPH)
Lesson: 
Retained data frequently contains 
privacy-sensitive information 
not visible from the user interface.
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$ python crunch.py
12.gpx 1.37 28.82 4188
13.gpx 1.37 28.82 4015
14.gpx 1.37 30.2 10095
15.gpx 1.37 28.82 3827
16.gpx 1.37 34.31 9830
17.gpx 1.37 34.31 8664
18.gpx 1.37 26.08 3405
19.gpx 1.37 34.31 8082
20.gpx 1.37 32.94 9023
21.gpx 1.37 32.94 11081
22.gpx 1.37 32.94 10880
23.gpx 1.37 32.94 3822
24.gpx 1.37 32.94 3964
25.gpx 1.37 34.31 5045
26.gpx 1.37 34.31 8826
27.gpx 1.37 34.31 8649
28.gpx 1.37 34.31 3907
29.gpx 1.37 28.82 7700
30.gpx 1.37 28.82 3774
31.gpx 1.37 17.84 996
129,773  records
20 files
  FILE       MIN     MAX     COUNT
Are there more hidden data?
My Nüvi always has 20 files in the /GPS/Archive directory
Can the deleted files be recovered? 




Are there more hidden data?
My Nüvi always has 20 files in the /GPS/Archive directory
Can the deleted files be recovered? 






The Sleuth Kit is an open source digital forensics toolset.
The fls program shows ‘deleted’ files and directories on storage devices.
• “*” indicates that the file is deleted:
28
  +++++ d/d 23676-144-1:! CrashReports
  +++++ r/d * 23442-48-2(realloc):! GoogleUpdateHelper.msi
 +++++ r/d * 23442-144-1(realloc):!GoogleUpdateHelper.msi
  +++++ r/d * 23439-48-2(realloc):! goopdate.dll
 +++++ r/d * 23439-144-1(realloc):!goopdate.dll
  +++++ r/d * 23441-48-2(realloc):! GoopdateBho.dll
 +++++ r/d * 23441-144-1(realloc):!GoopdateBho.dll
  +++++ r/d * 23443-48-2(realloc):! goopdateres_ar.dll
 +++++ r/d * 23443-144-5(realloc):!goopdateres_ar.dll
  +++++ r/d * 23444-48-2(realloc):! goopdateres_bg.dll
 +++++ r/d * 23444-144-1(realloc):!goopdateres_bg.dll
The “fls” program shows deleted files with a “*”:
We made a forensic image of the GPS “usb drive” and 
analyzed it with SleuthKit
SleuthKit shows no deleted files in the /GPS/Archive/ directory:
$ fls -r SLG-GARMAIN.E01  28
d/d 28:! GPX
+ r/r 54419718:! Current.gpx
+ d/d 54419720:! Archive
++ r/r 57598982:! 21.gpx
++ r/r 57598984:! 22.gpx
++ r/r 57598986:! 23.gpx
++ r/r 57598988:! 24.gpx
++ r/r 57598990:! 25.gpx
++ r/r 57598992:! 26.gpx
++ r/r 57598994:! 27.gpx
++ r/r 57598996:! 28.gpx
++ r/r 57598998:! 29.gpx
++ r/r 57599000:! 30.gpx
++ r/r 57599002:! 31.gpx
++ r/r 57599004:! 12.gpx
++ r/r 57599006:! 13.gpx
++ r/r 57599008:! 14.gpx
++ r/r 57599010:! 15.gpx
++ r/r 57599012:! 16.gpx
++ r/r 57599014:! 17.gpx
++ r/r 57599016:! 18.gpx
++ r/r 57599018:! 19.gpx
++ r/r 57599020:! 20.gpx
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Is there deleted 
Garmin XML that is not 
in a deleted file?
“Bulk data analysis” looks at the Garmin’s 
storage device sector-by-sector.
2510fe0: d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0 f0d0  ................
2510ff0: f0f0 d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0  ................
2511000: 6f69 6e74 4578 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c67  ointExtension><g
2511010: 7078 7470 783a 7370 6565 643e 3238 2e38  pxtpx:speed>28.8
2511020: 323c 2f67 7078 7470 783a 7370 6565 643e  2</gpxtpx:speed>
2511030: 3c67 7078 7470 783a 636f 7572 7365 3e32  <gpxtpx:course>2
2511040: 3234 2e34 373c 2f67 7078 7470 783a 636f  24.47</gpxtpx:co
2511050: 7572 7365 3e3c 2f67 7078 7470 783a 5472  urse></gpxtpx:Tr
2511060: 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 4578 7465 6e73 696f  ackPointExtensio
2511070: 6e3e 3c2f 6578 7465 6e73 696f 6e73 3e3c  n></extensions><
2511080: 2f74 726b 7074 3e3c 7472 6b70 7420 6c61  /trkpt><trkpt la
2511090: 743d 2233 392e 3936 3538 3637 2220 6c6f  t="39.965867" lo
25110a0: 6e3d 222d 3734 2e39 3132 3837 3622 3e3c  n="-74.912876"><
25110b0: 656c 653e 3235 2e31 333c 2f65 6c65 3e3c  ele>25.13</ele><
25110c0: 7469 6d65 3e32 3031 332d 3038 2d31 3854  time>2013-08-18T
25110d0: 3230 3a32 353a 3038 5a3c 2f74 696d 653e  20:25:08Z</time>
25110e0: 3c65 7874 656e 7369 6f6e 733e 3c67 7078  <extensions><gpx
25110f0: 7470 783a 5472 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 4578  tpx:TrackPointEx
2511100: 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c67 7078 7470 783a  tension><gpxtpx:
At the sector level, there are many XML records that are not in files.
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Our “bulk_extractor” program scans bulk data for 
forensically significant data.
Output is a directory containing:
• “Feature files;” histograms; carved objects
• Mostly in UTF-8; some XML
• Can be processed with Python-based tools
31









report.xml — log file
telephone.txt — list of phone numbers with context
telephone_histogram.txt — histogram of phone numbers
vcard/ — directory of VCARDs
...
“Digital media triage with bulk data 
analysis and bulk_extractor,” 
Simson L. Garfinkel, Computers and 
Security 32 (2013) 56-72
bulk_extractor has a scanner for GPX XML records.
GPX XML found on the drive is stored in the file “gps.txt” 
We processed the Garmin image with bulk_extractor and 
analyzed the GPS records:
$ more gps.txt 




83886185        ,,,,,111.53
83886435        2013-06-29T17:31:34Z,38.886777,-77.144822,99.15,10.98,114.3
83886685        2013-06-29T17:31:50Z,38.886160,-77.143053,100.60,8.24,115.7
83886934        2013-06-29T17:32:02Z,38.885877,-77.142233,99.63,5.49,115.76
83887183        2013-06-29T17:32:04Z,38.885841,-77.142125,99.15,4.12,131.29
83887432        2013-06-29T17:32:05Z,38.885827,-77.142082,99.15,4.12,151.06
83887681        2013-06-29T17:32:06Z,38.885727,-77.142003,98.67,5.49,168.00
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Thousands of entries are earlier than the first GPX file:




• A substantial amount of data can be recovered that is invisible.
The “gps.txt” output file 
shows many GPX records not in the allocated files.
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Allocated Bulk Data Analysis
Date Range June 24 - Oct 12 Feb 10 - Oct 12
# Entries 129,773 180,589
Garmin could improve privacy and transparency by applying 
basic privacy engineering.
Example mitigation strategies:
• Do not record information that’s not needed.
—Speed & elevation
• Overwrite GPX files when they are deleted
• Not recording track information when tracks are not displayed.
Improving privacy would negatively impact the value of digital forensics:
• Often the most valuable data in an investigation are hidden data.
—Visible data tips off the suspect.
• Investigators want as much data as possible.
—If the system throws out data, it might throw out something valuable.
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In George Ford’s Murder trial, critical information came from 
a hidden GPS.
• Murder of Shyanne Somers, 12, on July 8, 2007
• Convicted on 2009
• Key evidence: Tracking data from GPS hidden by Ford’s wife
If information is invisible, the criminal won’t try to erase it.
35
Optimistic decoding finds 
more private data
36
This is a serious problem.
Existing commercial digital forensic tools ignore 
compressed email addresses in bulk data.
62
e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......






Most digital forensic tools extract data, 










For example, email addresses are extracted from Word files by:
• Converting the file to text
• Processing the text with regular expressions.









COM TEXT TEXT  
TEXT TEXT
➼
[bulk data] ➼ RegEx ➼ Email Addresses
(This is how the GPX scanner works.)
Regular expressions can also extract features from data not 






a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
It’s easy to see email addresses in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+






Email addresses are a sequence of characters.
This sequence can be encoded in many ways.
XYZ@company.com
• Unicode UTF-8:      (Email)
5859 5a40 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d    XYZ@company.com
• Unicode UTF-16   (MS Word)
5800 5900 5a00 4000 6300 6f00 6d00 7000  X.Y.Z.@.c.o.m.p.
6100 6e00 7900 2e00 6300 6f00 6d00       a.n.y...c.o.m
• Base 64:     (Email attachments)
5746 6c61 5147 4e76 6258 4268 626e 6b75  WFlaQGNvbXBhbnku
5932 3974 4367 3d3d 3d0a                 Y29tCg===.
• Compressed:    (Browser cache)
1f9d 9058 b268 0132 e64d 1b38 61dc e471  ...X.h.2.M.8a..q
51b0 8d02                                Q...
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Compression works by eliminating repeated sequences:
Computers use compression to save memory:
5859 5a40 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  XYZ@company.com 
4142 4340 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  ABC@company.com 
4445 4640 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  DEF@company.com
Compressed with “gzip:”
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000            7.>..U..0...
Compressed email addresses do not “look” like email addresses!
—Forensic tools must decompress first to identify compressed email addresses.
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It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Mother.JPG
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......






• PDF file fragments
• ZIP archives
• Microsoft Office “x” files (docx, pptx, xlsx).
How much is being missed?
Existing digital forensic tools ignore compressed/encoded 
features in bulk data.
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e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......





• Web browser caches
• Windows Hibernation files.
How many encoded features 
are conventional tools missing?


















Using the Real Data Corpus, we show that optimistic 
decoding is important for forensic tools.
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tools would miss? 



















Some may be in both files and in non-files.




































































There are four different conditions for an email address on 
the media.
Condition #4 is invisible

























We devised an experiment to determine the size of 
condition #4 for a specific drive.






























































































bulk_extractor implements recursive re-analysis.
Data that are decompressed are re-analyzed.
bulk_extractor finds both plain and compressed text in bulk data













































The “feature files” show where the extracted features were 
found…  and how they were encoded.
Plain text features have numeric offsets:  
392175418








392175418    WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com   Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com\015\012
...
3772517888-GZIP-28322  user@company.com  onterey-<nobr>user@company.com</nobr>
...





























Post-processing can determine if a feature was in a file. 
(Both allocated and deleted files.)
Offset:  392175418  
Feature: WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
Context:!\012[User]\015\012Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
         \015\012Password=B@ji0
Filename:WINDOWS/system32/oobe/migx25a.dun 
MD5:     2b00042f7481c7b056c4b410d28f33cf      








135 out of 5700 email addresses are invisible to existing tools.







Cleartext 358 -- 5341 --
All Comp -- 9 -- 135
GZIP 50 14 36
HIBER 39 7 32
HIBER-GZIP 23 23
PDF 88 1 87
ZIP 28 7 21
ZIP-PDF 18 18
We ran bulk_extractor and identify_filenames.py on RDC 
drive IN10-0138 and examined the email encodings:
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We analyzed 1,646 RDC disk images with intact file systems. 
Many email addresses existed only encoded, in non-files.
66
Some drives had more than 10,000 compressed email addrs.
Coding                                 Drives    Emails   avg     max     σ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Plain in files                         739    81,920   110   4,206   253
2) Comp in files                          355    19,711    55   5,454   388
3) Plain in non-files                     860 1,956,059 2,274 178,073 9,248
4) Comp in non-files                      474   165,481   349  59,376 2,889
          BASE64 Comp                      54       219     4      50     7
          BASE64-GZIP Comp                  2        64    32      37     5
          GZIP Comp                       234    66,195   282   9,103   981
          GZIP-BASE64 Comp                  7        44     6      11     3
          GZIP-GZIP Comp                   15    12,663   844  11,845 2,944
          GZIP-GZIP-BASE64 Comp             2        38    19      30    11
          GZIP-GZIP-GZIP Comp               4        58    14      38    14
          GZIP-GZIP-ZIP Comp                1        12    12      12     0
        GZIP-PDF Comp                     5        38     7      30    11
          GZIP-ZIP Comp                     6        49     8      30     9
          HIBER Comp                       79     1,433    18     217    44
          PDF Comp                        162     2,352    14     238    31
          ZIP Comp                        388    85,252   219  59,369 3,025
          ZIP-BASE64 Comp                   5        30     6      13     5
          ZIP-BASE64-GZIP Comp              2        65    32      38     5
         ZIP-GZIP Comp                    14       261    18     132    34
         ZIP-PDF Comp                     26       115     4      18     4
Different encoding formats have different significance.
Likely PII sources:
• BASE64  — Email attachments
• GZIP   — Web browser caches (esp. JSON)
• PDF   — Personal Documents (PII)
• ZIP-PDF  — PDF archives
Public Data:
• BASE64-GZIP  — Open Source Software
• ZIP   — Typically from JAR files
• ZIP-ZIP-ZIP  — WinZip distributions
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TECHNICAL NOTE
DIGITAL & MULTIMEDIA SCIENCES
Simson L. Garfinkel,1 Ph.D.
The Prevalence of Encoded Digital Trace
Evidence in the Nonfile Space of Computer
Media*,†,‡
ABSTRACT: Forensically significant digital trace evidence that is frequently present in sectors of digital media not associated with allocated
or deleted files. Modern digital forensic tools generally do not decompress such data unless a specific file with a recognized file type is first
identified, potentially resulting in missed evidence. Email addresses are encoded differently for different file formats. As a result, trace evidence
can be categorized as Plain in File (PF), Encoded in File (EF), Plain Not in File (PNF), or Encoded Not in File (ENF). The tool bulk_extractor
finds all of these formats, but other forensic tools do not. A study of 961 storage devices purchased on the secondary market and shows that
474 contained encoded email addresses that were not in files (ENF). Different encoding formats are the result of different application programs
that processed different kinds of digital trace evidence. Specific encoding formats explored include BASE64, GZIP, PDF, HIBER, and ZIP.
KEYWORDS: forensic science, digital forensics, optimistic decompression, bulk_extractor, real data corpus, encoded nonfile, Microsoft
Xpress, BASE64, GZIP, PDF, ZIP
This study demonstrates that forensically significant digital
trace evidence that is compressed or otherwise encoded is fre-
quently present in sectors of digital media that are not associated
with allocated or deleted files. This finding is important, because
modern digital forensic tools generally do not decompress or
otherwise decode bytes in unallocated sectors unless a specific
file with a recognized file type is first identified. As a result,
today’s digital forensic tools potentially miss important evidence.
It has long been established (1,2) that a variety of information
can be present in Nonfile (NF) space on digital media. Such
information includes:
• Files that have been deleted and have had their file system
metadata overwritten, such that they can no longer be readily
identified. (Such files can sometimes be recovered through
file carving).
• Files that were previously written to the disk and have since
been partially overwritten, so that the entire file cannot be
recovered, not even with carving.
• Remnants of files that have been relocated as a result of file
system defragmentation operations, such that some sectors
are still recoverable.
• Remnants of files from previous file systems, after which the
drive was subsequently reformatted or damaged.
Previous research (3,4) also established at least five potential
sources of compressed or otherwise encoded data on digital media:
• Manyweb browsers download data fromweb servers as compressed
streams and store these streams directly in theweb cache.
• NTFS file compression may result in disk sectors that contain
compressed data.
• Windows hibernation files, compressed with Microsoft’s
XPress algorithm (5), are defragmented by Windows back-
ground tasks.
• Files are frequently bundled into archive formats that employ
compression (e.g., ZIP, RAR, and .tar.gz).
• The .docx and .pptx file formats used by Microsoft Office
store content as compressed XML files in ZIP archives (6).
In all cases, when these files are relocated during the course
of defragmentation, or when they are deleted and partially over-
written, compressed data can be left in unallocated sectors.
The phrases optimistic decompression (3) and optimistic
decoding refer to a data analysis approach in which a sequence
of bytes is examined to see whether it can be decompressed or
otherwise decoded. If so, the bytes are decoded and processed.
This approach is “optimistic” because the software proceeds with
the assumption that the decompression or decoding will be suc-
cessful, and the results are interpreted, even if there is corruption
or truncation that might prevent the recovery of the entire origi-
nal data stream.
This study gauges the overall usefulness of optimistic methods
by examining the results of their application to a corpus of more
than a thousand images from hard drives, USB storage devices,
and flash cards (referred to here as “drives” or “drive images”).
Clearly, the value of optimistic techniques depends on the
subject media under examination. A drive that consists solely of
blank sectors will not benefit from the technique, but a drive that
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HIBER-GZIP typically contains web browser memory.
• JSON object downloaded from Facebook by compressed HTTP
• In RAM, written to HIBER on disk when the system went into sleep.
• Frequently captures SSL-encrypted data.
Conclusion: 
• Optimistic encoding is important for finding identity information.
Some of the data are highly significant.
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...
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-1526   groups-noreply@linkedin.com   3d\134"groups-noreply@linkedin.com
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2018   m*****************@gmail.com  3d\134"m*****************@gmail.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2128   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2625   *******.consultancy@gmail.com 3d\134"*******.consultancy@gmail.c
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2736   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3186   san****@***********.com       \134" "san****@***********.com\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3685   Careers@******bank.com        3d\134"Careers@******bank.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4124   par****@team******.com        3d\134"par****@team******.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4149   u003epar****@team******.com   \134u003epar****@team******.com\13
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4607   d****.*****@gmail.com         3d\134"d****.*****@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4631   u003ed****.*****@gmail.com    \134u003ed****.*****@gmail.com\134
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5114   raj******@bsnl.in             3d\134"raj******@bsnl.in\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5558   kiran.***@****technology.com  3d\134"kiran.***@****technology.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5671   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
...
Finding more information with 
optimistic de-obfuscation
69
In 2013, a DoD partner told us that pre-processing forensic 
data with (XOR 255) yielded additional data.
This didn’t make a lot of sense.
• What additional data?
• (XOR 255) is not a strong encryption algorithm!
I worked with four interns to figure out why.
• CDT Aubin Heffernan, USMA
• CDT Scott Horras, USMA
• CDT Kyle Gorak, USMA
• Ms. Carolina Zarate, Poolesville High School 
Our plan:
• XOR all data in the Real Data Corpus
• Look for “interesting” information not visible without XOR.
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“A survey of XOR as a digital 
obfuscation technique in a 
corpus of real data,” IFIP 
WG11.9, January 2014, 
Vienna, VA
We created a new “scanner” that inverts each buffer








































We searched for valid data that had been XOR’ed.
These kinds of data can be automatically recognized with high reliability.
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DATA XOR(255) Windows PE header
DATA XOR(255) URL
DATA XOR(255) ZIP “Local Header”
DATA XOR(255) JPEG or Exif
We found substantial XOR’ed data.
These kinds of data can be recognized with high reliability.
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DATA XOR(255) Windows PE header
DATA XOR(255) URL
DATA XOR(255) ZIP “Local Header”





We examined anti-virus systems and found:
• Malware used XOR(255) to hide download URLs
• AV XOR’ed Malware that was put into QUARANTINE
• VirusTotal did not recognize uploaded malware that had been XORed.
XOR(255) in commercial software:
• Real Audio — to obscure Dr. Yuriy Reznik’s email address.
• Nero 7 — to hide a watermark (http://www.nero.com)
XOR(255) in Exfil’ed data:
• Fragments of a ZIP file that had been XOR’ed.
• Contents were Excel spreadsheets with names & salary data.
Both legitimate and illicit use of XOR(255) to hide data.
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XOR(255) is throughout the real data corpus:
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Year # URL # WinPE # ZIP #Exif
1980 4 7 0 0
1981 6 0 0 0
1985 15 0 0 0
1990 0 20 0 0
1996 2 11 0 0
1997 185 15 0 0
1998 443 126 3 0
1999 261 526 44 0
2000 252 526 12 0
2001 593 238 1 0
2002 734 234 1 0
2003 224 87 0 0
2004 1,359 427 34 0
2005 2,640 184 0 0
2006 1,934 3,840 6 0
2007 315 16,782 0 0
2008 1,376 1,973 0 0
2009 1,722 489 0 0
2010 802 468 0 0
2011 14,594 8 74 0
2013 11 1 0 0
2014 49 1 0 0
2016 10 1 0 0
2018 818 0 0 0
2019 3 0 0 0
2023 2 0 0 0
2027 346 0 0 0
2029 4 1 0 0
2030 4 2 0 0
2033 218 0 0 0
2037 14 0 0 0
2080 20 14 0 0
2081 10 2 0 0
no file 252,742 11,550 4,594 130
Total 281,712 37,533 4,769 130
Table 1: Validated XOR features by year for the analyzed drives, where the “year” is corresponds
to the modification time of the file within which each XOR-encoded feature was found. “no file”
indicates that the XOR-encoded features could not be located to a specific file. Timestamps prior to
1996 and after 2011 are likely the result of an improperly set system clock or on-disk corruption and
are reported here for completeness.
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XOR(255) was found in drives from (all) 21 countries .
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drives with drives with drives with drives with
country total drives XOR WinPE XOR URL XOR ZIP XOR exif
BANGLADESH 57 15 5 0 0
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 7 0 0 0 0
CANADA 48 8 1 0 0
CHINA 807 25 1 0 0
EGYPT 7 2 2 0 0
GERMANY 37 22 6 1 0
GHANA 19 8 1 0 0
GREECE 10 2 0 0 0
INDIA 603 185 77 13 4
ISRAEL 260 84 39 9 0
MEXICO 173 73 16 3 1
MONACO 11 6 2 0 1
NEW ZEALAND 1 0 0 0 0
PAKISTAN 81 31 2 0 0
PALESTINE, STATE OF 140 39 8 3 0
SINGAPORE 34 4 1 0 0
SWITZERLAND 2 0 0 0 0
THAILAND 17 9 1 2 1
TURKEY 10 6 2 0 0
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 87 62 7 19 0
Total 2,411 581 171 50 7
Table 2: Incidence of drives with Validated XOR features, by country
McAfee Risk Google OK Google Malware Total
High Risk 1,938 143 2,081
Medium Risk 1,301 9 1,310
Minimal Risk 24,090 6 24,096
Unverified 2,216 5 2,221
Total 29,545 163 29,708
Table 3: Cross tabulation of how the 30,684 URLs were classified by Google’s Safe Browsing API and
McAfee’s Real-Time Threats database.
test image Size without XOR with XOR D
nps-2009-domexusers 40GB 522 sec 799 sec +53%
nps-2011-2tb 2TB 34,140 sec 58,147 sec +70%
Table 4: Observed processing times for bulk_extractor with and without XOR scanner.
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There are opportunities to make de-obfuscation more efficient.
Solution 1 — Only use for specific cases.
Solution 2 — Examine data before XORing.
• Use cryptanalysis and knowledge of file headers, magic numbers, etc.
The current XOR implementation significantly increases 
processing time.
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Digital forensics — what’s next?
This work — Bulk Data Analysis and Optimistic Decoding
• Basic engineering: more decompression algorithms, improved efficiency
• Science: 
—Combine bulk data with file analysis for more complete understanding of media
—Develop approaches to increase precision and cluster returned results
Technical Privacy Auditing
• Developing a methodology for performing bit-level privacy audits.
—Consumer operating systems, cell phones, in-vehicle systems.
—Transport: analysis of app-to-server communications
Other forensic targets




There are persistent reports of sensitive information 
being left behind on consumer devices.
We showed how we can find hidden privacy-sensitive information in 
consumer GPS devices.
Optimistic decoding finds data present but hidden.
• De-compression
• De-obfuscation






























5/10/13 Recover deleted Snapchats? Decipher Forensics finds sexting app's privacy problem.
www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/09/recover_deleted_snapchats_decipher_forensics_finds_sexting_app_s_privacy.html 1/2
By  Will  Oremus  |  Posted  Thursday,  May  9,  2013,  at  3:56  PM
Snapchat's  users  shouldn't  be  shocked  to  find  that
their  images  can  be  recovered  even  after  they  "self-­
destruct"—but  they  will  be  anyway.
Sylvie  Bouchard/Shutterstock.com
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OMG,  "Deleted"  Snapchat  Sexts  Can  Actually  Be
Recovered
The  premise  of  Snapchat  is  simple:  Send  a  photo  or
short  video  to  a  friend,  and  it  will  self-­destruct  after
10  seconds.  That  way,  it  won’t  wind  up  on  the
Internet  and  ruin  anyone’s  reputation,  friendships,
or  career.
Needless  to  say,  that  has  made  it  a  wildly  popular
choice  for  sexting.  But  Snapchat’s  appeal  goes  far
beyond  that.  In  an  age  in  which  “privacy”  and
“technology”  have  become  almost  antonymous,  it
has  been  billed  as  the  anti-­Facebook—a
communications  tool  that  deletes  your  data  rather
than  preserving,  analyzing,  and  trading  on  it.  In
short,  it’s  supposed  to  make  messaging  fun  again.
But  the  app’s  security  has  never  been  ironclad.  As
the  media  have  repeatedly  warned  parents,  and
parents  in  turn  warned  their  kids,  message
recipients  can  still  save  a  compromising  image  by
taking  a  quick  screenshot.  But  Snapchat  tries  to
mitigate  the  risk  somewhat  by  automatically
notifying  the  sender  when  that  happens.  If
someone  screenshots  you,  it’s  a  virtual  slap  in  the
face.  If  they  don’t,  you  can  assume  you’re  in  the
clear.
Except  that  apparently  you  can’t.  KSL-­TV  in  Utah
reports  that  an  Orem-­based  firm  called  Decipher
Forensics  has  figured  out  a  way  to  recover  supposedly  deleted  images  from  the  recipient’s
phone.  The  process  isn’t  simple:  24-­year-­old  Decipher  forensics  examiner  Richard  Hickman  told
the  network  that  it  takes  him  about  six  hours,  on  average,  to  image  the  phone’s  data.  So  far
he  can  only  do  it  with  Android  devices,  though  he’s  working  on  doing  the  same  for  iOS.  But  his
firm  is  now  offering  to  perform  the  recovery  procedure  for  anyone  who  wants  it,  from  parents
to  lawyers  to  the  police,  for  $300  to  $500.
Snapchat  is  trying  to  brush  off  the  finding.  “We’re  not  really  paying  much  attention  to  it,”
spokeswoman  Mary  Ritti  told  U.S.  News  on  Thursday.  “I  mean,  it’s  forensic  software.”
She  has  a  point.  Forensic  software  can  also  recover  lots  of  other  things  you  thought  you  had
deleted  from  your  phone  or  computer,  provided  the  data  hasn’t  yet  been  overwritten  by  other
files.  The  reason  we  don’t  all  live  in  fear  of  this  happening  is  because  it  requires  someone  to
take  possession  of  your  device,  then  spend  a  bunch  of  time  and  money  combing  through  the
hidden  data.  If  they  can  do  that,  odds  are  you  have  other  security  problems  on  your  hands
besides  the  potential  recovery  of  some  embarrassing  snapshots.
And  for  what  it’s  worth,  Snapchat’s  privacy  policy  explicitly  states  that  there’s  no  guarantee
your  data  will  always  be  deleted.  “Messages,  therefore,  are  sent  at  the  risk  of  the  user,”  it  says.
Still,  Snapchat’s  users  are  unlikely  to  be  mollified  if  it  turns  out  their  nude  selfies  have  been
preserved  for  posterity  after  all.
If  Snapchat’s  young  founders  soon  find  themselves  on  the  wrong  end  of  a  successful  lawsuit,
the  lesson  won’t  be  that  they  failed  at  protecting  their  users’  privacy.  It  will  be  that  it’s
dangerous  to  build  a  business  on  the  illusion  of  privacy  in  the  first  place.
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and  Arizona  State  University.
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